Introduction of the Concept of Functional Resonance in the Analysis of a Near-Accident in Aviation. by Nouvel, David et al.
Introduction of the Concept of Functional Resonance in
the Analysis of a Near-Accident in Aviation.
David Nouvel, Se´bastien Travadel, Erik Hollnagel
To cite this version:
David Nouvel, Se´bastien Travadel, Erik Hollnagel. Introduction of the Concept of Functional
Resonance in the Analysis of a Near-Accident in Aviation.. 33rd ESReDA Seminar: Future
challenges of accident investigation, Nov 2007, Ispra, Italy. 9 p., 2007. <hal-00614258>
HAL Id: hal-00614258
https://hal-mines-paristech.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00614258
Submitted on 10 Aug 2011
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
33rd ESReDA Seminar: Future challenges of accident investigation
Introduction of the Concept of Functional Resonance
in the Analysis of a Near-Accident in Aviation.
David NOUVEL, Sébastien TRAVADEL
Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses pour la sécurité de l’aviation civile
Statistics and Safety Analysis Division
Bâtiment 153, Aéroport du Bourget
93352, LE BOURGET Cedex, France
Erik HOLLNAGEL
École nationale supérieure des Mines de Paris
Pôle Cindyniques
Rue Claude Daunesse
F-06904, Sophia Antipolis, France
The analysis  of  complex events  shows that  the performance of  crew members and/or  air  
traffic  controllers,  as well  as the aircraft  and its  systems,  may vary within different  time  
frames. Thus, the understanding of the current situation can differ significantly within the  
crew and between the cockpit and the ground, as well as be at odds with the aircraft’s real  
position and attitude over time. Further, these components interact throughout the flight. 
This paper presents a proposal for how better to model these complex interdependencies,  
using the principles of the Functional Resonance Accident Model (FRAM). The outcomes of  
this  modelling  can conveniently  be shown by means of  open source software,  the FRAM 
Visualizer.
Using an incident initiated where the Captain selected the wrong HSI track, we explore the  
many factors that influenced the situation when the crew put the aircraft into descent but  
failed  to  intercept  the  localizer.  This  led  to  a  crisis  that  they  had to  manage,  departing  
significantly from Standard Procedures, and without being fully aware of their proximity to  
the ground when they initiated a go-around.
Our aim is to develop new analytical tools in order to better characterize and understand 
how the flight evolved beyond acceptable safety margins, and how the crew recovered from a 
critical situation. Some of the factors and their comparative interactions identified in this  
manner may reveal inherent risks that are still present but also preventable.
Keywords: Functional resonance analysis, aircraft accident investigation, 
The BEA investigated an incident that occurred on 23 November 1997 on approach to Paris-
Orly  to  the  MD83  registered  F-GRMC.  A  final  report1 was  issued  at  the  time.  It  was 
determined that the incident resulted from the decision to put the aircraft into descent when, 
as a result of a display error, it was neither on the localizer track nor on the glide path, and 
with  no  context  defined  for  this  improvised  manoeuvre.  The  operator’s  company  culture 
directly contributed to the incident through the importance it attached to accelerated training 
given  to  new First  Officer  and  to  undertaking  commercial  flights.  Ten  years  later,  a  re-
1 The final report on this event is available on www.bea.aero
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analysis using functional resonance methods provides a better characterisation of the evolving 
circumstances in which the crew actions took place.
1. The Functional Resonance Accident Model
The functional resonance accident model (FRAM; Hollnagel, 2004) describes system failure 
in terms of the resonance of normal performance variability. This provides a convenient way 
of representing the non-linear propagation of events and also makes it possible to account for 
adverse  outcomes  in  cases  where  there  were  no  manifest  malfunctions  or  failures.  The 
principle of FRAM is to characterise individual system functions independently of how they 
may be connected in a specific situation. The characterisation of each function – or node – is 
done in terms of six aspects and the values of these aspects determine how nodes may be 
coupled  under  given  conditions.  To  produce  a  description  of  functional  variability  and 
potential resonance, and to determine recommendations for damping unwanted variability, a 
FRAM analysis consists of four steps: 
Step 1: Identify essential system functions, and characterise each function by six basic aspects 
or parameters. The six aspects are input (I, that which the function uses or transforms), output 
(O, that which the function produces), preconditions (P, conditions that must be fulfilled to 
perform a function), resources (R, that which the function needs or consumes), time (T, that 
which affects time availability), and control (C, that which supervises or adjusts the function). 
Nodes and their aspects may be described in a table and can subsequently visualized in a 
hexagonal representation (cf. Figure 2 and 4 below). 
Step 2: Characterize the context dependent variability of each node. For an accident analysis, 
the variability  is  known from the  investigation  data.  In  this  case  the  analysis  focuses  on 
comparing the observed and the normal performance. For risk assessment, the variability may 
be derived from a characterisation of the common performance conditions (CPCs), of which 
there  currently  are  eleven.  These  CPCs  address  the  combined  human,  technological,  and 
organizational aspects of each function. After identifying the CPCs, the variability must be 
determined  in  a  qualitative  way  in  terms  of  stability,  predictability,  sufficiency,  and 
boundaries of performance.
Step 3: Defining the functional resonance based on possible dependencies/couplings among 
functions and the potential for functional variability. The output of the functional description 
of step 1 is a characterisation of functions and their aspects. The aspects provides the basis for 
identifying how functions may be coupled. For example, the output of one function may be an 
input to another function, or produce a resource, fulfil a pre-condition, or enforce a control or 
time constraint. When the couplings between functions are found, this is combined with the 
characterization of performance variability from Step 2. In this way the analysis will show 
how  the  variability  of  one  function  may  have  an  impact  on  others.  This  analysis  thus 
determines  how  resonance,  and  ultimately  adverse  outcomes,  can  result  from  variability 
across  functions  in  the  system.  For  example,  if  the output  of  a  function  is  unpredictably 
variable,  another  function  that  depends  on  this  output  as  a  resource  may  be  performed 
unpredictably. Many such occurrences and propagations of variability may have an effect like 
resonance.
Step 4: Identify barriers for variability (damping factors) and specify required performance 
monitoring. Barriers are hindrances that may either prevent an unwanted event from taking 
place,  or protect against  the consequences (Hollnagel,  2004). Barriers  can be described in 
terms  of  barrier  systems  (the  organizational  and/or  physical  structure  of  the  barrier)  and 
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barrier  functions  (the manner  by which the barrier  achieves  its  purpose).  In FRAM, four 
categories of barrier systems are identified (each with their potential barrier functions, see 
Hollnagel, 2004). In addition to recommendations for barriers, FRAM can also be used to 
specify  recommendations  for  the  monitoring  of  performance  and variability,  as  a  way to 
detect and manage undesired variability. Performance indicators may thus be developed for 
every function and every link between functions. 
2. Example of application to a complex incident
2.1 Summary of the incident
During  a  commercial  flight  to  Paris-Orly,  the  Captain  decided  to  perform  an  automatic 
landing due to the weather conditions at destination. Since the First Officer was not qualified 
for this procedure, the Captain took over most of the crew actions. On approach, he selected a 
wrong approach track on the HSI. Due to this error, the auto-pilot did not intercept the landing 
track (localizer), and the aircraft departed from the published trajectory. The Captain tried to 
recover from this situation by selecting, unsuccessfully, various modes on the auto-pilot. The 
aircraft crossed the glide path and twenty seconds later, the Captain corrected the selection of 
the  track  on  the  HSI.  At  the  same  time,  he  put  the  aircraft  into  descent,  heading 
simultaneously towards the approach track. The auto-pilot was not able to capture the glide 
path, so that the aircraft continued its descent without external references. The Captain did not 
manage to stabilize his approach,  and eventually initiated a go-around. The lowest height 
reached by the aircraft was 67 feet from the ground.
Figure 1: Horizontal (upper graph) and vertical (lower graph) tracks.
2.2 Description of the event using the FRAM Visualizer
The FRAM Visualizer is a tool which is used to describe the event as a set of functions and 
their associated control parameters. A node defines the basic information unit. There is no 
scale restriction to describe a function. In this example, it was decided to take the elementary 
action, such as the action of positioning the index on the HSI, to define the resolution of the 
scheme.  This is in line with the pilot’s sequencing of actions: action – check – correction. 
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However, the availability of the data impeded the appropriate breaking down of the sequence 
and led to a more macroscopic approach for some functions.
We considered mainly the incident flight from the start of radar vectoring by Orly Approach 
to the go-around performed by the Captain. Nevertheless, some preliminary information was 
relevant to set the initial circumstances that developed throughout this phase of flight. Indeed, 
the first node corresponds to the “task-sharing decision”. 
The fact that the Captain departed significantly from the standard procedure, and improvised a 
sequence of actions, challenged the usual examination of a flight through the identification of 
deficiencies  as  compared  to  a  standard  flight.  The  standard  flight  could  not  be  the  sole 
reference  to  break  down the  actions  performed  into  a  comprehensive  set  of  nodes.  This 
justified the choice of taking into account a mix of:
• either standard procedures that were followed (high level of performance),
• or standard procedures that were not or poorly followed (low level of performance),
• or improvised actions that can be seen as an attempt to adapt to an unusual situation with 
more or less success.
Below is an example of a node corresponding to the action by the Captain of rotating the HSI 
index  from  the  interception  heading  to  the  landing  track.  According  to  the  operator’s 
operating  manual,  this  action  is  undertaken  once  the  LOC CAP mode  is  displayed,  and 
triggers a check by the First Officer.
Figure 2: Description of a node by FRAM Visualizer.
Two inputs were identified: one triggered the action (LOC CAP display) and the other was a 
parameter that would evolve throughout the action. This choice will be discussed in Section 
3.1.
The outputs include a callout that should have triggered a check by the first officer as well as 
the incorrect positioning of the index. In order to refer to the resonance approach,  it  was 
decided to take into account the variation of the output,  between a “nominal” state and a 
“downgraded” state. In this latter case, the corresponding output was qualified as: “wrong”, 
“failed”, etc. 
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The  selection  of  track  258  provided  erroneous  information  to  position  the  index.  This 
information persisted during the action and was therefore considered as a precondition.
The control of the function can be seen as a test of the consistency of the respective positions 
of the index and the needle in accordance with the heading. The proximity of the tail of the 
needle with the intended landing track was misleading when the Captain positioned,  as a 
reflex, the index on the tail  of the needle.  A quick check did not allow him to detect the 
discrepancy. However the reading of the heading led the Captain to feel that something was 
wrong. The figure below illustrates the display seen by the Captain, as compared to the one 
with the correct track selection.
Figure 3: Left side: incorrect positioning of the index on the tail of the needle, taking into account the erroneous 
track selection (258°). Right side: intended position of the index on the head of the needle, with the correct track 
selection (065°)
At this stage, it should be noted that the functional approach helps to question the role and the 
description of every action, such as the one specified in the operating manual. For instance, 
while elaborating this node, in connection with the others, it was noticed that the operating 
manual did not specify what this check by the First Officer should refer to and more generally 
what was the intention of this action.
2.3 Connections of the nodes
The  FRAM  Visualizer  automatically  connects  the  control  parameters  of  the  nodes.  This 
function provides graphic information regarding the influence that one parameter can have on 
several nodes.
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Figure 4: Automatically generated visualization by FRAM Visualizer
The automatically generated visualization produced a rather intricate scheme. It was then de-
cided to rearrange the nodes in a time-sequenced scheme as shown in the next figure. 
Figure 5:  Horizontal  track (blue dots) and 
FRAM nodes
For this representation, we decided to portray the Captain’s actions on the main track, and po-
sition the other nodes along side. The nodes are sorted according to whether they refer to:
• crew actions,
• system functioning,
• aircraft motion,
• system display.
This representation intrinsically defines some “components”, by analogy with dynamic sys-
tems. 
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2.4 Focus on three sequences of the incident highlighted by FRAM
It should be noted that it was not possible to collect any additional data or to undertake any 
simulation processes and, therefore, the statements that follow are only valuable for purposes 
of illustration but do not constitute, stricto sensu, new investigation findings. However, using 
the functional approach, the data was put together with a view to placing the actors back in 
their  interactive  context,  in  order  to  bring  to  light  developed  information. We  provide 
hereafter three examples of sequences that refer to the Captain’s perception and adaptation. 
2.4.1    Captain’s sequence awareness  
The functional approach brought to light the fact that the Captain had a kind of sequence 
awareness, in the sense that his experienced partially counter-balanced his poor situational 
awareness.  This  is  probably one of the factors  that  led him to alter  the heading by forty 
degrees  to  capture  the  localizer  track,  after  he  crossed  the  approach  track,  whereas  the 
situation displayed on his HSI would rather suggest that he keep the previous interception 
heading. Later on, the glide deviation triggered some reactions by the Captain. In particular, 
he called for gear extension as the aircraft was approaching the glide path. Even though this 
call  came  late  in  comparison  the  standard  procedure,  it  shows  that  the  Captain  acted 
reactively. From this perspective, the fact that the aircraft crossed the glide path the first time 
probably increased the time pressure on the Captain. As he did not capture the localizer, he 
did not put the aircraft  into descent at that time, nor did he call for the flaps. Instead,  he 
focused his  attention  on his  horizontal  situation  till  he  understood his  mistake.  When he 
noticed his wrong track selection, he tried to catch up with his vertical position. It would be 
interesting to deeper analyse the parameters that determine the Captain’s sequence awareness. 
They certainly vary in importance according to the phase of the approach. In this respect, it’s 
worth  comparing  the  above-mentioned  circumstances  to  the  circumstances  in  which  the 
Captain initiated the go-around.
2.4.2    Captain’s understanding of the erroneous track selection  
During the fifteen second sequence preceding the Captain’s correction of the track selection, 
the aircraft was heading straight with wings level; there was no radio communication. The 
situation  displayed  on the  HSI was “consistent”  with  an  interception  phase.  The Captain 
armed the ILS mode and then expected the autopilot to capture the localizer. He was then, for 
the first time, in appropriate conditions to scrutinize his HSI and discover the discrepancy. 
2.4.3    Captain’s decision to go around  
As the aircraft crossed the glide path for the second time, the “glide slope” warning sounded, 
followed by an announcement by the First Officer. The Captain disconnected the auto-pilot, 
turned left to intercept the landing track as the needle became alive on his HSI. He then re-
connected the auto-pilot and, within a few seconds, disengaged it and initiated the go-around. 
According to his testimony, the Captain was not aware of his vertical position and decided to 
go-around because he did not feel stabilized. The use of FRAM suggests that this feeling may 
be influenced by the gap between the modes displayed on the FMA and the ones expected at 
this stage according to the operating manual. Indeed, none of the three modes expected were 
displayed on the FMA. 
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3. A contribution to further developments to FRAM 
3.1 States, functions and definitions
The FRAM Visualizer was initially designed to describe functions, such as actions by the 
crew. However, it can be seen that, for instance, the node shown as an example in section 2 is 
a mix of an action, the Captain positioning the index, and a change of state, the rotation of the 
index. In this case, the understanding of the consequences of this function was not hampered. 
The  situation  becomes  more  challenging  regarding  the  evolution  of  the  HSI  display  in 
accordance  to  the  aircraft  position.  Therefore,  it  appeared  necessary  to  distinguish  the 
functions that refer to a crew action from the functions referring to change of states of systems 
such as the HSI or the autopilot mode announcement (FMA). From this perspective, it became 
necessary to define the control parameters of a node in accordance with its nature. 
From an “action” perspective, an input is something which triggers an action that produces an 
output. The control parameter is understood as an immediate check, associated with an action. 
A resource-consuming  control  action,  such as  a  check prescribed  in  a  standard  operating 
procedure, is described via a dedicated node. The precondition is understood as a contextual 
element that influenced the result of the function, that pre-existed to the function and that 
varied slowly during the function’s processing. The fact that the crew experienced poor CRM 
was a precondition of most of the functions during the approach. 
From the “state” perspective, an input is something processed by the system to produce the 
output. The precondition is then a necessary condition for the state to evolve. For instance, the 
fact that the localizer track be captured was a precondition for the capture of the glide by the 
autopilot. The periodic check by the automatic system of the situation - the non interception 
of the localizer track – did not allow for the successful change of state of the autopilot, from 
an armed mode to a track mode.  From this perspective, the resource refers to the kind of 
energy required. 
Time is a parameter which requires further work to be taken into account. During this study, 
the associated tag was simply used to position a node in the sequence. Time should intervene 
as a control parameter of the variation of the function. 
3.2 Multilayer analysis
The need to take into account the interactions between different components such as systems 
or crew members calls for a rearrangement of these components in various layers. From this 
perspective, each layer would describe the evolution in time (chain of functions or changes of 
states) of homogeneous components. It would be then necessary to represent the interactions 
between  the  layers.  This  kind  of  distinction  would  facilitate  comprehension  of  the 
interactions, as well as the identification of the resonance phenomenon. Indeed, components 
of the same nature tend to evolve on a similar time scale. For instance, the aircraft followed a 
quite simple track during the approach, marked by three changes of heading; at the same time, 
the FMA displayed a multitude of different modes. 
4. Conclusion
The functional approach should lead us to question every action performed or missed. In this 
sense, the development of this method should help with the collection of data in the course of 
an investigation. Moreover, it highlights the deficiencies of a function itself, as well as those 
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related to the immediate  context  of an action.  The connection  of the nodes through their 
control parameters shows the evolution of this context. 
However,  the  analysis  must  further  consider  systemic  deficiencies.  How  did  an  adverse 
outcome  propagate?  How  were  its  effects  dampened  or  heightened?  To  answer  these 
questions  in  relation  to  a  complex  environment,  it  appears  necessary  to  pursue  the 
development  of the analytical  tools,  and to better  describe the evolution over time of the 
interactions. The challenge is to point out some necessary factors that condition the stability 
of the standard “flight structure”.
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